by Michael Rose
First published 2008
Rose examines two wars separated by centuries but connected by strategy. In 1775, George Washington faced the world's most powerful military force with a ragtag collection of rebels the British dismissed as vagrants and deserters. Washington won by abandoning conventional battle tactics and embracing guerrilla warfare, using ambush attacks and indirect strikes to defeat an empire. Rose then shifts to 2003, when America invaded Iraq and encountered its own insurgency problem. President Bush and his advisers repeated the same errors that cost Britain its American colonies. Both powers failed to deploy adequate forces early and struggled with counterinsurgency's central challenge: conducting military operations while winning over local populations. Rose argues that Britain learned from its colonial defeats and maintained global dominance, while America ignores the strategic wisdom of its own revolutionary heritage. The book reveals how insurgency warfare exposes the limitations of conventional military thinking across different eras.
Genres: 20th-century, 21st-century, military-history, american-history
Vibes: suspenseful, thought-provoking
Tropes: enemies-to-lovers, fish-out-of-water
Setting: America, Britain, Iraq
Period: 1775, 2003
256 pages · Hardcover · Pegasus Books